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Abstract
In supplier-retailer interactions, the retailer may carry inventories strategically as a bargain-
ing mechanism to induce the supplier to drop the future wholesale price. As per Anand et al.
(2008), the introduction of strategic inventories always benefits the supplier and possibly also the
retailer if the holding cost is sufficiently low (due to the contract-space-expansion effect). Is such
a move beneficial for the supply chain agents in the presence of process improvement efforts?
Such efforts—initiated by suppliers—ultimately reduce production cost and may translate into
lower wholesale prices as well as lower consumer prices. We find that strategic inventories may
stimulate investment in process improvement when the holding cost is high (as it encourages
the supplier to further reduce future cost to eliminate the need for strategic inventories), but
may suppress such investment when the holding cost is low (as strategic inventories are cheap
to stock and hence cannot be eliminated). Our key result, contrary to the existing literature, is
that strategic inventories may be harmful to both supply chain agents in the presence of process
improvement. In that case, the supplier effectively over-invests in process improvement efforts,
inducing the retailer to reduce the stock of strategic inventories, while reversing the benefits
of the contract-space-expansion effect. We also consider variations to the model, whereby the
supplier may delay his investment decision, the holding cost may be a function of the wholesale
price set by the supplier, consumers may behave strategically, and the planning horizon may
consist of multiple periods.
Keywords: Supply Chain Management; Process Improvement; Strategic Inventories.
1 Introduction
Firms are constantly engaged in improving their internal processes in order to reduce the unit cost of
production. New technologies and opportunities allow firms to take advantage of emerging solutions
that facilitate future reductions in the cost of their operations. For instance, 3D printing bears a
significant potential for firms in the manufacturing sector to transform their processes, ultimately
allowing them to have a cheaper and a more efficient production system (examples include GE
or the PSA Group, a French automotive firm, see Fortune, 2016). Cost reduction efforts are not
limited to adoption of new technologies and can also emerge as an outcome of traditional process
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management methods. Indeed, according to a cost management survey, streamlining business
processes turned out to be one of the main tactical approaches for Fortune 1000 firms to remain
competitive (Deloitte, 2013). One such example is the continuous improvement program at John
Deere, which seeks to embrace lean processes and further engage suppliers in order to reduce the
overall cost of the end products. The benefits of such investments in new technologies and improved
processes may not be immediate, as the integration and implementation requires an overhaul of
the design (of the product and/or the process), may be time consuming, and possibly may need to
wait until the facility can be shut down.1
Due to their nature, such process improvement and cost reduction efforts usually require long
lead times. Namely, investment into such efforts are made well in advance before the outcome
of the impact on the cost reduction are realized (Li and Wan, 2016). Recognizing that in such
environments firms find it difficult to engage in long-term contracts (Li and Wan, 2016; Tirole,
1986),2 firms oftentimes engage in new contractual arrangements once the new transactional costs
are determined.
To circumvent, and to some degree divert potential consequences, suppliers who are involved in
such efforts will preannounce their investments into process improvement to garner the attention
and proper reaction of their immediate customers along the supply chain—the retailers. Being
aware of such a renegotiation opportunity, retailers may then carry inventories strategically as a
bargaining chip against their suppliers (Anand et al., 2008). Specifically, by holding to some in-
ventories, retailers can force their suppliers to lower the wholesale price when the new contract
is signed. On the one hand, carrying inventories is a costly friction (the inventory-drain effect in
Anand et al., 2008); however, on the other hand, this inventory allows the retailer to source using
two different prices: the original wholesale price from the stock of strategically-carried inventory
and the newly negotiated wholesale price from the supplier (the contract-space-expansion effect in
Anand et al., 2008). When the latter effect dominates, which occurs for a large range of holding
1In the automotive sector, for instance, such changes may occur only once a new model is introduced or once a
new facility is built. However, new methods allow producers now to continuously introduce such improvements in
their manufacturing process (see https://eu.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/foreign/2017/11/07/toyota-cuts-
production-costs-record-research-budget/107431598/).
2Tirole (1986) highlighted two aspects that limit firms from engaging in long-term contracts in such environments:
lack of commitment power that may result in contract breaches and renegotiations, and the potential uncertainty
associated with the outcomes of the efforts and hence the inability to identify an appropriate contract. While in this
manuscript we abstract away from the issues pertaining to uncertainly, many of the challenges persist.
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cost values, the level of double marginalization is reduced, and the supply chain is better off. While
the supplier cannot eliminate strategic inventories held by the retailer, he can control their level
via the first period wholesale price. These results have been derived by Anand et al. (2008) in the
absence of process improvement. Accordingly, our interest is in the effect of this preannounced com-
mitment into process improvement on the inventories carried by the retailer and the corresponding
performance of both supply chain agents.
In the presence of process improvement, the product’s unit cost is likely to decrease over time.
The supplier may thus have an incentive to pass on some of the savings to the retailers in a
later stage, in order to induce them to increase their purchased amount (rather than decrease the
purchased amount as the retailer can also make use of available stock). Namely, the supplier might
have an incentive to commit to process improvement efforts—as an additional leverage to affect
strategic inventories—thereby indicating a future drop in cost, and hence in wholesale price, which
could signal to the retailer that stocking strategic inventories is not necessary. Consequently, we
raise the question: do retailers still strategically stock inventories when their suppliers are engaged
in process improvement efforts? Alternatively, do strategic inventories stimulate or discourage
investment in process improvement efforts?
Our analysis highlights the importance of the delayed cost reduction effect. When the retailer
contemplates carrying strategic inventories, such an option may suppress investment in process
improvement when the cost of holding inventory is sufficiently low (in relation to the cost of the
cost reduction), but may stimulate investment in such process improvement when the holding cost
of inventory is sufficiently high. The intuition is that with a low holding cost, the threat of holding
inventories strategically is high, which suppresses the supplier’s incentive to invest. In such a case,
some inventories may be carried and the investment in process improvement will apply to a smaller
quantity of units that will be purchased by the retailer. Alternatively, when the holding cost is
high, the quantities stocked are naturally reduced, thereby increasing the incentive of the supplier
to invest in reducing the unit cost in the future. Furthermore, in such a case, the supplier invests
more than in the absence of such inventories as the supplier seeks to suppress the retailer’s incentive
to stock strategic inventories entirely.
This delayed cost reduction effect goes beyond the intricate relationship between inventories and
process improvement. As the level of inventories decreases, some of the inventory-drain burden is
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relieved while completely reversing the benefits stemming from contract-space-expansion effect. In
other words, process improvement induces the retailer to decrease the levels of inventories thereby
reducing the contract space, effectively making both the supplier and the retailer worse off when
the holding cost is sufficiently high.
We further consider and discuss variations to the model. Specifically, we explore (i) whether
the supplier shall actually commit to the investment in process improvement or shall he delay the
decision? (ii) whether replacing the fixed holding cost with a holding cost that is a function of the
wholesale price (which is set by the supplier) alters the insights of our analysis; (iii) the impact
induced by the presence of strategic consumers who may wait for lower prices in the second period;
and (iv) the implications of additional periods in the planning horizon.
2 Literature Review
Our research links process improvement decisions to strategic inventory decisions, in settings that
may be characterized by strategic consumers. Process improvement has been intensively studied in
the operations management and industrial organization literature, including process improvement
decisions in supply chains. Much work has been done on settings with downstream competition,
focusing on issues such as the decision of the buyer (or retailer) to outsource production and
process improvement (Gilbert et al., 2006), a shared supplier’s process improvement decision when
one of the buyers can integrate with the supplier (Chen and Sappington, 2009), and the supplier’s
process improvement decision in a context with competing supply chains when a supply chain can
integrate (Gupta and Loulou, 1998; Gupta, 2008). Upstream competition between suppliers and
supplier process improvement has been considered in Li (2013), for instance.
Regarding the nature of process improvement itself, the literature identifies two main types:
process improvement as the result of (i) learning by doing or (ii) deliberate investment. The
learning by doing literature typically addresses cost-reducing process improvement in multi-period
models, and assumes that the cost reductions in a later time period are the results of production
at some earlier point. Gray et al. (2009) model a setting with a contract manufacturer and an
original equipment manufacturer (OEM). The OEM can outsource production to the contract
manufacturer, while both actors can reduce the unit cost of production as the result of learning
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by doing. Following up on this, Li et al. (2015) model a supply chain with one manufacturer and
one retailer, and consider the effect of learning by doing on a manufacturer’s inventory decision
and the effectiveness of revenue sharing contracts. Shum et al. (2017) study a firm engaged in a
two-period dynamic pricing game with strategic consumers and uncontrolled process improvement
between the periods. Importantly, next to learning by doing they include cost reduction as a result
of some random technology advancement.
Process improvement investment papers have considered multi-period approaches. Using a
Markov Decision Process, Fine and Porteus (1989) determine a firm’s optimal process improve-
ment investment policy. In each decision epoch, a small process improvement (such as a setup
cost reduction) can be realized. Li and Rajagopalan (2008) identify optimal process improvement
investment policies based on a multi-period real-options model. In their model, process improve-
ment investments increase the knowledge of the process. If successful, process improvement may
lead to a higher probability of success of future investments, as well as higher product quality and
cash flows. Most papers in this stream, however, focus on the immediate effect of the investment
in single period settings, using game-theoretic frameworks. In the early work of d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988) a duopoly was considered in which a process improvement competition stage
preceded a quantity competition stage, while in Veldman et al. (2014) process improvement and
duopolistic quantity competition take place simultaneously (after the observation of managerial
incentive contracts for process improvement). Process improvement investment papers taking a
supply chain point of view either assume that process improvement investment decisions may pre-
cede the supplier’s wholesale pricing decision (Bernstein and Ko¨k, 2009; Ge et al., 2014) or let the
investment and wholesale pricing decisions take place simultaneously, as in Ha et al. (2017). In
contrast to the learning by doing stream—where the cost reduction effects of learning are typically
postponed to a next time period—it seems that in the process improvement investment stream the
investment effectuates as soon as possible.
As stated earlier, it is well recognized that process improvement projects are lengthy, often with
uncertain outcomes (Li and Wan, 2016; Li and Arreola-Risa, 2017). In the body of the paper, we
abstract away from the realization of uncertainty and similar to many contributions, we assume
deterministic outcomes (see, e.g., Chu and Sappington, 2007, Laffont and Tirole, 1986, Rogerson,
2003, Yenipazarli, 2017, and a review by Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Nevertheless, papers differ with
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respect to the timing of the contract elements. For instance, while Rogerson (1992) assumes the
contract is signed before efforts take place, Dasgupta (1990) and Piccione and Tan (1996) assume
contracting takes place after the effort choices are made.
The key contribution of our research to the literature on process improvement is the consid-
eration of strategic inventories. While generally this literature abstracts away from the concept
of inventories, we explicitly account for their presence, which can play an instrumental role in
the interaction between the two supply chains agents, as they—when carried strategically by the
retailer—may circumvent actions taken by the supplier and, quite importantly, may affect his in-
vestment in process improvement.
The literature on strategic inventories is limited. Strategic inventories were identified by Anand
et al. (2008) who recognized their role in multi-period environments. In their model they show that
the retailer has an incentive to stock such inventories in order to force the supplier to set a lower
second period wholesale price. More recently, Arya and Mittendorf (2013) consider the mediating
role that rebates offered by manufacturers directly to consumers have on strategic inventories. Arya
et al. (2014) extend the strategic inventories framework to incorporate decentralized decision making
in procurement and inventory control, while Mantin and Jiang (2017) let strategic inventories
deteriorate over time. Liu et al. (2012) include a commitment by the retailer through an ex ante
announced price markup (on top of the wholesale price) and a price protection policy by the
manufacturer. Also they show that unique solutions exist for extended (finite) time horizons, and
consider other forms of demand functions. An interesting treatment is offered by Hartwig et al.
(2015) who test the effect of strategic inventories on supply chain performance by conducting an
empirical study in a lab environment. They show that strategic inventories have a positive effect
on performance above and beyond that projected by theory—this is driven by the fact that the
presence of strategic inventories induce the buyer and the seller to reduce the payoff inequalities.
More recently, Roy et al. (2018) have discussed the implications of inventory visibility (i.e., whether
the manufacturer can observe the amount of strategic inventories carried by the retailer) which,
they show, may increase or decrease the amount of inventory strategically carried by the retailer.
We complement the literature on strategic inventories by accounting for the well-established
notion of process improvement. Such investments, broadly intended to reduce the unit cost, may
or may not be translated into lower wholesale price, and hence could alter the retailer’s incentive
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to carry strategic inventories.
3 Modeling Framework
In this section we introduce the modeling framework where the supplier may invest in cost-reducing
process improvement and the retailer may carry strategic inventories. In §5 we extend the frame-
work by including the possibility of facing strategic consumers.
Using the framework of Anand et al. (2008) with dynamic price contracts as a workhorse, we
consider a two-period setting and a simple supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer. In
each of the periods the supplier sets a wholesale price and the retailer decides the order quantity.
Further, a new cohort of consumers arrives in each of the periods. The demand stemming from
these consumers follows a linear relationship such that pi = a − qi, i ∈ {1, 2}, where pi and qi are
the price and demand, respectively, in period i. Throughout the paper we let a = 1. We assume
that after each period, the retailer sells all products offered to the market. The timeline of events,
which is depicted in Figure 1, is as follows.
Period 1: Supplier The supplier decides whether or not to invest in process improvement, which
reduces the cost of producing a product c in the second period by x. Without loss of gen-
erality, we normalize c to zero.3 The investment cost of this process improvement, 12γx
2, is
incurred in the first period. The process improvement cost parameter γ measures the sup-
plier’s improvement capability. It is common in the literature to model process improvement
investments as quadratic functions to allow for decreasing returns to scale and limited orga-
nizational investment budget (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Gupta and Loulou, 1998;
Veldman et al., 2014). Throughout the paper we assume that γ > 12 .
4 The supplier also sets
the first period wholesale price, w1. We study a linear wholesale pricing scheme as linear
prices are widely adopted in practice (Sluis and De Giovanni, 2016), and these schemes allow
3In case of a model with a market size a and constant cost of production c we can always choose the parameter
values of a, c such that c > x and all other (sufficient second-order and positivity) conditions are met. See the Online
Appendix A for the details of such a more general model. Moreover, in the case with a = 1 and c = 0 it is easy to
verify that in the cases we present in the next section, in equilibrium x < 1 always.
4This bound is derived from the case with process improvement (see §4.2), and ensures that the second-stage whole-
sale price is positive. Sufficient second-order conditions and positivity conditions are given in Online Appendix B.
As we show there, there may be stricter lower bounds on γ in the case with strategic consumers, which is presented
in §5.
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 Profit analysis  
Setting The Retailer .. The Supplier .. Reference 
𝑁 → 𝑃 always benefits always benefits §4.1 
𝑆 → 𝑃𝑆 always benefits always benefits §4.3.2, proposition 4 
𝑁 → 𝑆 benefits only if ℎ < 0.138 always benefits §4.2 
𝑃 → 𝑃𝑆 benefits only if ℎ < 𝑓(𝛾)† benefits only if ℎ < 𝑓(𝛾)‡ §4.3.3, proposition 5 
𝑁 → 𝑃𝑆 benefits only if ℎ, 𝛾 ∉ Ω* always benefits This section 
† The right-hand side of this inequality is monotonically increasing in 𝛾, with lim𝛾→∞ 𝑓(𝛾) = 0.138. 
‡ The right-hand side of this inequality is monotonically increasing in 𝛾, with lim𝛾→∞ 𝑓(𝛾) = 0.25. 
* We can define Ω as the semi-open area in the ℎ, 𝛾-plane with ℎ, 𝛾 > 0. The area is bounded by 𝛾 > 21.351,  ℎ < 𝑓(𝛾) and ℎ > 𝑔(𝛾), where 
 ℎ = 𝑓(𝛾) is monotonically increasing in 𝛾 and ℎ = 𝑔(𝛾) is monotonically decreasing in 𝛾. Furthermore we have lim𝛾→∞ 𝑓(𝛾) = 0.25  
and lim𝛾→∞ 𝑔(𝛾) = 0.138. 
Period 2 
Supplier invests in 
process improvement, 
𝑥, and sets Period 1’s 
wholesale price, 𝑤1 
Retailer orders 
𝑞1 + 𝐼 units and 
sells 𝑞1 units at 
price 𝑝1 
Supplier sets 
Period 2’s 
wholesale 
price, 𝑤2 
 
Retailer orders 
𝑞2 units and 
sells 𝑞2 + 𝐼 
units at price, 𝑝2 
 
Period 1 
𝐼 units carried over 
at a cost ℎ per unit 
{𝜋𝑅𝑁 ,𝜋𝑆𝑁} Case N 
{𝜋𝑅𝑆,𝜋𝑆𝑆} Case S 
{𝜋𝑅𝑃,𝜋𝑆𝑃} Case P 
{𝜋𝑅𝑃𝑆,𝜋𝑆𝑃𝑆} Case PS 
Process improvement investment 
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NO 
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Figure 1: Timeline of events.
us to isolate the strategic effects of process improvement and inventories.
Period 1: Retailer The retailer decides how many units to purchase in the first period. This
amount corresponds to two sub-decisions: how many to sell in the first period, q1, at a price
p1 (=1 − q1), and how many to carry over fro he first period over to the next, I, while
incurring a holding cost of h per unit. Similar to Anand et al. (2008), we assume throughout
the paper that 0 < h < 14 .
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Period 2: Supplier The supplier sets the second period’s wholesale price, w2.
Period 2: Retailer The retailer purchases q2 units and sells a total of q2 + I units at a price p2.
The retailer’s profit in the second period is given by
ΠR,2 = (q2 + I)p2 − q2w2,
where p2 = 1− (q2 + I). The retailer’s total profit is expressed as
ΠR = q1p1 − (q1 + I)w1 − Ih+ ΠR,2.
Similarly, the supplier’s profit in the second period is given by
ΠS,2 = q2(w2 + x),
5The lower bound ensures that holding inventories is costly whereas the upper bound is required to ensure feasibility
of stocking inventories.
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and the supplier’s total profit is
ΠS = (q1 + I)w1 − 1
2
γx2 + ΠS,2.
Throughout the paper we assume that the process improvement investment yields the intended
unit cost reduction with absolute certainty. Naturally process improvement projects might fail due
to circumstances beyond the supplier’s control. Assuming uncertainty in the success rate of the
project, however, does not critically affect our results.6
Finally, in our model, the market parameters as well as the holding and process improvement
cost parameters are common knowledge to both supply chain agents.7 We solve the model by
backward induction to yield the optimal decisions of the retailer and the supplier.
4 Model analysis
We carry out the analysis in several steps. We first highlight, separately, the role of strategic
inventories in the absence of process improvement—which is essentially the seminal result of Anand
et al. (2008)—and the role of process improvement in the absence of strategic inventories. We then
proceed by analyzing the complete model incorporating the combined effects of these two decisions.
Accordingly, we revisit the decisions made by the retailer and supplier, respectively, to assess
whether the logic is sustained.
6Similar to Veldman et al. (2014) we can let θ denote the probability of success of the process improvement project.
If the stochastic variable y denotes the uncertain unit cost reduction of the supplier, we have that y(θ, x) is either x
with probability θ or 0 with probability 1− θ. The supplier’s expected profits in the second period can be written as
Π¯S,2 = q2(w2 + θx), while his expected total profit becomes Π¯S = (q1 + I)w1 − 12γx2 + Π¯S,2. By setting θx = z, we
can write Π¯S = (q1 + I)w1 − 12
(
γ
θ2
)
z2 + q2(w2 + z). Letting
γ
θ2
= γn, all outcomes become functions of γn (among
others). Clearly γn decreases in θ so the effect of θ on the outcomes can be easily obtained when knowing the effect
of γn. Moreover, note that both in the deterministic and stochastic case the retailer responds to the outcomes of the
process improvement project. Therefore no additional assumptions are needed in terms of the retailer’s knowledge of
θ (or any other probability distribution parameters), γ, or any potential uncertainty related to γ.
7While we assume a deterministic market size, one can also consider stochasticity with respect to the market size.
Specifically, following Gu¨mu¨s¸ et al. (2013), assume the market size (i.e., the demand intercept) in the second period,
is either high (1 + θ) or low (1− θ) with probability λ1+θ and λ1−θ, respectively, such that λ1+θ + λ1−θ = 1. As in
Gu¨mu¨s¸ et al. (2013), for expositional simplicity, let λN =
1
2
for N ∈ {1 + θ, 1− θ}, and the corresponding expressions
only change by a constant that is a function of θ. Thus, all results follow through.
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4.1 When are strategic inventories profitable in the absence of process improve-
ment?
To understand the role of inventories in the interaction between the retailer and his supplier, we
isolate this decision by assuming that no investment is made, or possible, in process improvement.
Thus, we compare two scenarios: in the first, the retailer does not consider carrying strategic
inventories, and in the second, this option is evaluated by the retailer. This is essentially the
analysis that was carried out by Anand et al. (2008). In the absence of inventories, the problem
trivially becomes a repeated single period setting, where the supplier sets the wholesale price to 12
and the retailer responds by ordering a quantity of 14 in each of the periods. Accordingly, using a
superscript N to denote profits in the case without process improvement and strategic inventories,
the retailer and supplier profits over the two periods are ΠNR =
1
8 and Π
N
S =
1
4 , respectively.
Once the retailer carries inventories, then he induces the supplier to reduce the wholesale price
set in the second period. Specifically, as the model is solved backwards, it easy to see that w2 =
1
2 − I. Hence, the retailer has an incentive to stock inventories in order to force the supplier to
reduce the future wholesale price. The retailer carries inventories only if the benefits of wholesale
price reduction exceed their holding cost. Solving backwards, we have that the retailer’s optimal
inventory choice is I = 12 − 23(w1 + h). That is, the inventory the retailer carries decreases in the
holding cost as well as in the first period wholesale price. That is, the retailer recognizes the power
of strategic inventories in affecting the future wholesale price and responds to the wholesale price
set by the supplier in the first period. The supplier then realizes the importance of w1 in affecting
the retailer’s decision and sets w1 =
9−2h
17 , which induces the retailer to carry strictly positive
inventory levels, as the optimal inventory level is given by I = 534 − 10h17 . This is important, as
the supplier raises the wholesale price above the single period optimal price of 12 , while the second
period wholesale price, w2 =
6+10h
17 , is always below
1
2 (and hence less than w1). The resulting
profits of the supplier and retailer are, respectively,
ΠSS =
8h2 − 4h+ 9
34
(1)
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and
ΠSR =
304h2 − 118h+ 155
1156
, (2)
where the superscript S refers to the scenario where strategic inventories may be carried in the
absence of process improvement. It can be verified that in the presence of strategic inventories,
the retailer is better off only when h < 21152 ≈ 0.138, while the supplier is always better off (see
Proposition 1 in Anand et al. 2008). Hence, as long as the holding cost is not too high, the retailer
has a strong incentive to stock inventories as a strategic instrument in the dynamic interaction
with the supplier. When the holding cost is sufficiently high (but below 14), the retailer might seek
to commit to not stocking strategic inventories at all. However, given the dynamic nature of the
interaction, the retailer’s commitment might not be credible as once the supplier has set the first
period wholesale price, it is always in the best interest of the retailer to stock some inventories
strategically and, hence, he cannot avoid the profit loss when the holding cost is sufficiently high.
4.2 When is process improvement profitable in the absence of strategic inven-
tories?
To isolate the effect of process improvement, we abstract away from strategic inventories and
consider two scenarios. In the first, no investment is considered (and hence this coincides with
the benchmark case considered in the previous subsection), and in the second we let the supplier
evaluate this option. When the supplier considers the option of improving the process, it can
reduce the unit cost with x per unit between the first and second period, by investing an amount
of 12γx
2. In that case, in the absence of strategic inventories, the supplier sets w1 =
1
2 and chooses
x = 14γ−1 > 0, which results in w2 =
2γ−1
4γ−1 > 0. Note that w1 > w2. Hence, the first period wholesale
price is independent of the investment in the process improvement, and only the second period
wholesale price is affected—it increases in the process improvement cost parameter, γ. Letting the
superscript P denote the case of process improvement in the absence of strategic inventories, the
resulting profits of the retailer and supplier are ΠPR =
32γ2−8γ+1
16(4γ−1)2 and Π
P
S =
8γ−1
8(4γ−1) , respectively,
indicating that process improvement makes both the retailer and the supplier always better off.
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4.3 Process improvement and strategic inventories
Could strategic inventories hinder process improvement? As we have seen, the retailer always
stocks strategic inventories as a bargaining chip against the supplier. If such inventories are kept,
the incentive of the supplier to invest in process improvement, and hence further lowering w2,
could be diminished. At the same time, we have observed that both are better off due to process
improvement, and hence it is to their mutual benefit to make sure such investments are made.
Alternatively, could the threat of strategic inventories stimulate investment in process improvement?
The retailer could use inventories as an instrument to further encourage the supplier to stimulate
investment in process improvement. By investing in process improvement in the first period, the
supplier implicitly commits to lower wholesale prices in the second period, which may induce the
retailer to lower strategic inventories. Accordingly, the interaction between the decisions made by
the supplier and retailer, respectively, are revisited in this section. We start by solving the complete
model and then we proceed to highlight the impact of the two decisions.
4.3.1 Analysis of process improvement and strategic inventory levels
The analysis is similar to that carried in §4.1 with the addition of the supplier’s choice of process
improvement investments in the first period. The characterization of the equilibrium outcomes is
summarized in the following statement, where the superscript PS indicates the current scenario
where both process improvement and strategic inventories are part of the consideration set of the
supplier and retailer, respectively. All proofs can be found in Online Appendix C.
Proposition 1. Define hˆ ≡ 5(4γ−3)8(10 γ−3) . When the supplier may invest in process improvement and
the retailer may stock strategic inventories, in equilibrium:
IPS =

−80γh+20γ+24h−15
2(68γ−33) h < hˆ
0 otherwise
(3)
xPS =

2(5+14h)
68γ−33 h < hˆ
1
4γ−1 otherwise
(4)
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{
wPS1 , w
PS
2
}
=

{
4(−2γh+9γ+2h−4)
68γ−33 ,
2(−20γh+12γ+13h−7)
68γ−33
}
h < hˆ{
1
2 ,
2γ−1
4γ−1
}
otherwise
(5)
{
pPS1 , p
PS
2
}
=

{−8γh+104γ+8h−49)
2(68γ−33) ,
40γh+92γ−26h−47)
2(68γ−33)
}
h < hˆ{
3
4 ,
3γ−1
4γ−1
}
otherwise.
(6)
The resulting profits of the retailer and the supplier are, respectively,
ΠPSS =

2(8 γ h2−4 γ h−h2+9 γ+4h−4)
−33+68 γ h < hˆ
8 γ−1
8(4 γ−1) otherwise
(7)
and
ΠPSR =

2432 γ2h2−944 γ2h−1504 γ h2+1240 γ2+1344 γ h+346h2−1160 γ−295h+295
2(−33+68 γ)2 h < hˆ
32 γ2−8 γ+1
16(4 γ−1)2 otherwise.
(8)
It is evident that the retailer’s choice of strategic inventories (I) depends on the holding cost,
h, and the process improvement cost parameter, γ. Specifically, there exists a threshold holding
cost (which is a function of γ) above which inventories are not carried strategically any longer.
The elimination of strategic inventories by process improvement investment is a new result that
complements that of Anand et al. (2008).
Furthermore, in the parameter area where strategic inventories are carried, we notice that the
possibility of using process improvement as a commitment device to lower wholesale prices in the
second period, has an overall dampening effect on strategic inventories. The following proposition
summarizes.
Proposition 2. Process improvement suppresses the incentive to hold strategic inventories (IS ≥
IPS). Further, the introduction of process improvement completely eliminates strategic inventories
when h > hˆ.
This is an important result as it differs from the case where investment in process improvement
is absent. Recall that in the benchmark case, which follows the model of Anand et al. (2008), the
retailer carries strategic inventories in the entire feasible range, i.e., whenever h < 14 . However,
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now due to the process improvement, the retailer effectively eliminates such inventories if the
holding cost is sufficiently high, or alternatively, when the process improvement cost parameter, γ,
is sufficiently low.
This result is displayed graphically in Figure 2a. Quite naturally, the effect diminishes in γ,
since higher values of γ imply a higher cost of investment in process improvement, which reduces
the supplier’s investment and therefore reduces the cost reduction in the second period, thereby
limiting overall the retailer’s incentive to reduce the amount of strategic inventories stocked.
It is also evident that the supplier will always invest in process improvement (that is, x is
always positive). However, the effect of the presence of strategic inventories on investment in
process improvement is not uniformly positive or negative. The following proposition highlights
the surprising effect of strategic inventories on process improvement levels (recall the definition of
hˆ in Proposition 1).
Proposition 3. For h < 28γ−2328(4γ−1) , strategic inventories suppress investment in process improvement
(xPS < xP ), whereas for 28γ−2328(4γ−1) < h < hˆ strategic inventories stimulate investment in process
improvement (xPS > xP ). When h > hˆ, since no strategic inventories are carried any longer, they
do not alter the investment in process improvement (i.e., xPS = xP ).
This result is illustrated in Figure 2b. The figure illustrates the dampening effect of strategic
inventories on process improvement investments in the largest part of the parameter area where
strategic inventories are carried. In this parameter area the supplier will not use process im-
provement to completely offset the use of strategic inventories by the retailer. From the retailer’s
perspective, the negative implications of inventory carryover are more than compensated by the
wholesale price reduction in the second period, which is the result of the combined effects of pro-
cess improvement and the strategic effect of inventories. From a comparative statics viewpoint, we
see that strategic inventories monotonically decrease in h while process improvement increases in
h. For large enough h, given γ, low strategic inventory levels incentivize the supplier to increase,
rather than decrease process improvements levels, beyond the level set at zero inventories.
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(a) Impact of process improvement on strategic
inventories (% reduction)
(b) Impact of strategic inventories on process im-
provement
Figure 2: Process improvement and strategic inventories.
Recall from an earlier footnote that we could assume a probability of success of the investment
θ. Knowing that ∂I∂γ =
36(5+14h)
(68γ−33)2 > 0 the effects of uncertain investment outcomes can be easily
assessed. That is, strategic inventories increase as the success probability decreases, which is a
straightforward result.
4.3.2 Is investment in process improvement beneficial in the presence of strategic
inventories?
We have observed that the supplier will always invest in process improvement, whether the retailer
will stock strategic inventories or not. From a profit point of view, process improvement is clearly
beneficial to both supply chain agents when no strategic inventories are carried. In the presence of
strategic inventories, we have seen in Proposition 2 that process improvement suppresses strategic
inventories. As the supplier has a Stackelberg position when it comes to process improvement
investments, and the retailer will always benefit from process improvement due to lower wholesale
prices in the second stage, we would expect that process improvement will benefit both the supplier
and the retailer in the presence of strategic inventories. Proposition 4 confirms this intuition.
Proposition 4. Assume the retailer considers carrying strategic inventories. Then, process im-
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provement investments will make both the supplier and the retailer better off (i.e., ΠPSS > Π
S
S and
ΠPSR > Π
S
R).
This complements the discussion from §4.2, supporting the notion that the supplier’s investment
in process improvement is beneficial to both the supplier and the retailer regardless of whether the
retailer considers, or not, to carry strategic inventories. Hence, one can conclude that the supplier
always has the incentive to invest in process improvement. We next explore the impact of strategic
inventories assuming the supplier makes such an investment in improving its processes.
4.3.3 Are strategic inventories beneficial in the presence of process improvement?
We have noted that in the case without process improvement (§4.1), the retailer is better off with
strategic inventories only when the holding cost is sufficiently low (h < 0.138) while the supplier is
always better off. Does the same qualitative insight hold in the presence of process improvement?
That is, does it hold true that the consideration of strategic inventories by the retailer will always
make the supplier better off? Recall that the supplier will always make a strictly positive process
improvement investment, whether or not strategic inventories are carried, and that the retailer’s
incentive to stock strategic inventories is diminished (Proposition 2). Comparing the retailer’s
and supplier’s profits in the two cases where the supplier invests in process improvement—when
strategic inventories are absent (i.e., ΠPR and Π
P
S ) vs. when they are considered by the retailer (i.e.,
ΠPSR and Π
PS
S )—we establish the range of parameters where the retailer and supplier benefit from
stocking strategic inventories when the supplier invests in process improvement.
Proposition 5. Assume the supplier invests in process improvement. Then, stocking strategic
inventories (which occurs when h < hˆ) will make the supplier better off (i.e., ΠPSS > Π
P
S ) when
h < f(γ) ≡ 32 γ2−40 γ+8−
√
272 γ2−200 γ+33
4(32 γ2−12 γ+1) , and worse off otherwise (i.e., Π
PS
S < Π
P
S ), and will make
the retailer better off (i.e., ΠPSR > Π
P
R) when h < g(γ) ≡ 3776γ
3−6320γ2+2524γ−295−√X
4(1216γ2−752γ+173)(4γ−1) , and worse
off otherwise (i.e., ΠPSR < Π
P
R), where X is defined in the proof.
While it is not too surprising that the retailer can be worse off due to strategic inventories
when the supplier invests in process improvement, the fact that the supplier can be worse off is a
new result. Specifically, in §4.1 we have seen that in the absence of process improvement, strategic
inventories always benefit the supplier. Further, as process improvement is always profit improving
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(see §4.2), one might expect that strategic inventories in the presence of investment in process
improvement will still benefit the supplier. Figure 3 illustrates how the supplier’s, the retailer’s,
as well as the supply chain’s profits are affected due to the carrying of strategic inventories by the
retailer, along with the threshold hˆ ≡ 5(4γ−3)8(10 γ−3) , above which no strategic inventories are carried (in
which case there is no difference in the profit of the different parties).
Figure 3: Change in profit due to strategic inventories in the presence of process improvement (S:
Supplier, R: Retailer, SC: Supply Chain).
What drives this surprising result? Recall that in the absence of process improvement, the
introduction of strategic inventories has benefited the supplier as they have improved the channel
coordination between the retailer and the supplier. Despite the holding cost incurred by the retailer
(the inventory-drain effect), holding strategic inventories allows the retailer to source at two prices
(w1 and w2), thereby increasing the space of alternatives faced by the retailer (the contract-space-
expansion effect). This latter effect reduces the level of double marginalization and benefits the
supplier, who, in effect, controls the inventory carried by the retailer. This effect also benefits
the retailer as long as it dominates the inventory-drain effect, the cost of which is incurred by the
retailer. Once the supplier invests in process improvement, another element enters the equation: the
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delayed cost reduction effect, i.e., the implicit commitment to unit cost reduction over time. In the
absence of strategic inventories, the supplier—being the Stackelberg leader—is able to fully benefit
from investment in process improvement; however, the introduction of strategic inventories may
weaken the potential to do so. The first effect that occurs is over-investment in process improvement.
As can be observed from Figure 2b, the supplier invests more in process improvement due to the
threat of strategic inventories when holding costs are high enough. But the fact that this reduces
his profits suggests that the supplier would actually fare better under lower process improvement
levels.8 Such over-investment induces even lower second period wholesale prices, and while the
retailer still stocks strategic inventories, the combined effect hurts the supplier. More important is
the direct effect of process improvement on the level of strategic inventories. Due to the investment
in process improvement, the supplier signals to the retailer that he is committed to reductions in the
product’s unit cost and hence the need to stock inventories strategically diminishes. By reducing
the level of inventories, the retailer reliefs some of the inventory-drain burden, but at the same
time he completely reverses the benefits of the contract-space-expansion effect. That is, process
improvement induces the retailer to stock lower levels of inventories which reduce the contract
space, effectively making both the supplier and the retailer worse off when h is sufficiently high.
Finally, it may be noted that given any value of γ, there always exists an h above which the
supplier is worse off. This can be illustrated by analyzing the various thresholds from Proposition 5
when γ approaches infinity (letting process improvement levels approach but not converge to zero).
Specifically, the supplier is worse off when h > f(γ)|γ→∞ = 0.25, which is the upper limit of h in
Anand et al. (2008). Finally, the retailer is worse off when h > g(γ)|γ→∞ = 21152 ≈ 0.138, which
again is the threshold from Anand et al. (2008) in the case of no process improvement.
4.4 Summary and discussion
Table 1 provides an overview of the various cases under consideration, contingent on whether or
not process improvement and strategic inventories are carried.
8Note that the area where process improvement increases due to strategic inventories (see Figure 2b) is fully part
of the area where the supplier is worse off (see Figure 3).
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Table 1: Case overview.
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Let us briefly reflect on how the profits of the two supply chain actors change, when the supplier
decides to invest in process improvement, or the retailer decides to carry strategic inventories. As we
noted in §4.2 and Proposition 4, an investment in process improvement by the supplier is beneficial
for both parties, whether strategic inventories are not carri d at all (i.e., N → P ) or are ndeed
carried (S → PS). The effects of strategic inventories are less straightforward. Carrying strategic
inventories in the absence of process improvement (N → S) mirrors the results given by Anand
et al. (2008). That is, the supplier always benefits from strategic inventories, whereas the retailer
benefits only when holding costs are low enough (see §4.1). When the supplier invests in process
improvement, the profit implications of inventory carryover (P → PS) are not immediately clear.
Specifically, the retailer’s profit increases only when holding costs are low and process improvement
cost (characterized by γ) is high. Interestingly, we see that the supplier may be worse off, whereas
he generally benefits from strategic inventories when no process improvement investments are made.
Finally, we might wonder whether the supplier or the retailer could be better off by making
no investments in process improvement and have no strategic inventory carryover at all, when we
compare this to the case where both are strictly positive (N → PS). As the supplier makes the
first move by committing to process improvement (and sets w1 to manipulate purchasing behavior),
it might not come as a surprise that he always fares better under PS.
The story is different for the retailer. To be precise, there exists an area Ω within the feasible
parameter region where the retailer does not benefit from the combined use of process improvement
and strategic inventories.9 So even though the retailer benefits from process improvementN → P ,
9The Ω area is illustrated in Online Appendix D.
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retailer profits drop below the profits obtained in N , when in addition strategic inventories are
carried (P → PS). As Ω is characterized (among others) by high γ the benefits obtained from a
small process improvement investment are clearly outweighed by the profit decrease due to strategic
inventories. Table 2 summarizes.
Table 2: Profit analysis.
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Note that we generally observe that the supplier always invests in process improvement. We
also saw earlier that strategic inventory generally suppresses process improvement investments. We
can consider whether this also implies that the gains from investing in process improvement are
higher when no strategic inventories are carried, compared to the situation where inventories are
carried. Indeed, comparing firm profits on the path N → P with P → PS, it is clear that both
the supplier and retailer benefit the most from process improvement when inventories are absent.
5 Robustness and Extensions
We consider several important extensions and robustness analyses. In §5.1 we let the supplier delay
his investment announcement. In §5.2 we study the implications of having the holding cost be a
function of the wholesale price. §5.3 accounts for the potential presence of strategic consumers.
§5.4 visits the possibility of having longer horizons.
5.1 Delayed Investment Announcement
In our main model we have assumed that the supplier commits to the process improvement invest-
ment ahead of any interaction between the supplier and the retailer. One can challenge this choice
and argue that the supplier could be better off by replacing this commitment with an option that
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could be exercised by the supplier at the end of the first period (while still affecting the unit cost
of the second period).10 Does this dramatically alter the decisions and outcomes predicted by our
core model? Or, more specifically, is it in the best interest of the supplier to commit early to an
investment in process improvement? In this section we explore the alterations due to this change
in the sequence of events.
In terms of the model we assume that the supplier sets the process improvement level in the
second period simultaneously with the decision w2, while bearing the investment cost in the second
period as well. Equilibrium outcomes are given in Online Appendix E. The next proposition essen-
tially captures the comparison between this delayed investment case, and the PS case presented in
§ 4.3.
Proposition 6. When the supplier may invest in process improvement and the retailer may stock
strategic inventories, then delaying the announcement of process improvement investments (D)
has the following effects: Process improvement investments (i) increase if strategic inventories are
carried in both D and PS cases (xD|ID,IPS>0 > xPS |ID,IPS>0), (ii) are identical if no inventories
are carried at all in both cases (xD|ID,IPS=0 = xPS |ID,IPS=0), (iii) either increase or decrease
(based on a threshold inventory holding cost level) if inventories are only carried in the PS case
(xD|ID=0,IPS>0 6= xPS |ID=0,IPS>0). Furthermore, the delayed investment decision reduces strategic
inventories (ID < IPS).
Our first observation is that under the delayed investment decision, the area where strategic
inventories are carried decreases. That is, inventories are carried if h < hˆD, while we can verify
that hˆD < hˆ. This yields three sub-areas. For every h < hˆD, process improvement increases when
the investment decision is delayed. Now, the supplier has both the wholesale price and process
improvement level in the second stage at his disposal, which results in higher process improvement
levels. If h > hˆ then inventories are absent in both cases. This eliminates the strategic effect
of delaying the announcement of process improvement, resulting in identical process improvement
levels. Finally, if hˆD < h < hˆ, then inventories are carried only in the PS case. The fact that in this
10Alternatively, the supplier could make an investment in the first period and reduce costs in both periods. Such an
option, however, could increase cost reduction levels while simultaneously incentivizing the retailer to carry strategic
inventories. Although this case is interesting in its own right, the focus of this paper is on delayed implementation of
process improvement investments. Hence, we will not elaborate on the case where the investment already effectuates
in the first period.
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area process improvement may either increase or decrease is a result that mimics Proposition 3 and
Figure 2b: for 28γ−2328(4γ−1) < h < hˆ process improvement decreases because of the delayed investment
decision while for hˆD < h < 28γ−2328(4γ−1) process improvement increases.
Next, observe that less inventory is carried. While on the one hand the supplier cannot use the
process improvement announcement in the first period to signal cost reductions in the second period
(eliminating the strategic effect of process improvement over time), it can better align wholesale
prices to eliminate strategic inventories.
Given this new equilibrium, is the retailer better off compared to the PS case? On the one hand,
the retailer gives up some of his bargaining capacity and, evidently, he ends up paying more for
the units in the second period despite the larger investment in process improvement, while, on the
other hand, he benefits from reduced stocking levels and lower first period wholesale price. We find
that the latter effect dominates, as the retailer is always better off under the delayed commitment
setting. In this setting it seems that the delayed announcement acts as an intermediary to reduce
the effect of double marginalization, at least from the retailer’s perspective, such that the retailer is
better off overall. This further supports some of the results derived from the main model presented
in Propositions 2 and 4.
While the retailer is always better off, does this also hold true for the supplier? After all, the
supplier can benefit from elimination of inventories which facilitates greater investment in process
improvement and hence greater savings. However, we have also noticed that strategic inventories
are not necessarily the most favorable alternative of the supplier. As suggested already, the delayed
announcement which results in lower inventories indeed provides the retailer with some relief from
his inventory-drain burden but at the same time this completely reverses the benefits of the contract-
space-expansion effect. Yet, while this still benefits the retailer, with this reduction in strategic
inventories the supplier ends up being worse off when the process improvement cost parameter γ
is sufficiently high. This is illustrated in Figure 4.11
11In our setting in this subsection, we assume that γ does not change if the decision is delayed. However, in
practice, such a delay comes at a cost in the form of a higher γ value (as the implementation need to be expedited).
This will certainly bear a negative implication on the decision to delay the decision, which, as indicated Figure 4, is
already tilting in favor of pre-announcing this commitment, rather than delaying to a later point in time.
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Figure 4: Effects of delayed investment on supplier profits (the superscript D indicates the delayed
announcement case).
5.2 Wholesale price-dependent holding cost
Thus far, and consistent with the strategic inventories literature, we have assumed that the holding
cost is exogenous. However, it is not unusual to find examples where the holding cost is a function
of the cost of the units carried as inventories, and more specifically from the retailer’s perspective,
as a function of the wholesale price of the good. While one can easily replace the holding cost per
unit with a holding cost that is the product of holding cost rate and the wholesale price of the
good, a question emerges: will this change the outcome of the model and analysis? Intuitively, if
the supplier can affect the retailer’s holding cost, then he has another lever to induce the retailer
to make decisions that are better aligned with the supplier’s objective. At the same time, this may
limit the supplier’s actions as a higher wholesale price may discourage the retailer from stocking
inventory, which may actually harm the supplier (recall, e.g., from §4.1 that the supplier is better
off when the retailer carries strategic inventories). We explore the impact of such wholesale price-
dependent holding cost in this subsection.12
12We thank the anonymous referees for suggesting this extension.
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We first consider the seminal setting studied by Anand et al. (2008). That is, we seek to explore
whether inventory decisions are altered in the absence of process improvement considerations.
Recall, in the absence of process improvement, the optimal inventory amounted to IS = 534 − 10h17 .
Now, when we replace the holding cost with iw1 and resolve the model, we find that the optimal
inventory is given by ISh = (2i+5)(2i−1)
2(4i2−4i−17) , with superscript h denoting the current case with the
revised holding cost. Returning to the base model, we replace h with iw1 where w1 is the wholesale
price which solves w1 =
9−2iw1
17 . This yields I
S = 5−10i34+4i . Since the model with percentage holding
cost requires i < 0.5, we can prove that ISh ≥ IS with equality holding only for i ∈ {0, 0.5}. This
is an interesting result suggesting that the supplier induces the retailer to stock a higher level of
inventory through the manipulation of the wholesale price as compared with the base model.
In the more general case, when process improvement is present, we have that IPS =[
−80γh+20γ+24h−15
2(68γ−33)
]+
. Similarly, we replace h with iw1 and solve w1 =
4(−2γiw1+9γ+2iw1−4)
68γ−33 for
w1, ultimately giving rise to I
PS =
[
− 40γi−20γ−8i+152(8γi+68γ−8i−33)
]+
. When the holding cost is a function of
the wholesale price we have IPSh =
[
64γ4i2+128γ4i−48γ3i2−80γ4−96γ3i+12γ2i2+144γ3+24γ2i−γi2−76γ2−2γi+15γ−1
2(64γ4i2−64γ4i−48γ3i2−272γ4+128γ3i+12γ2i2+368γ3−68γ2i−γi2−168γ2+14γi+31γ−i−2)
]+
.
We find that the former is lower than IPS for any γ value less than about 7. This means that
for reasonable values of the process improvement cost parameter we obtain the opposite result.
Namely, the supplier induces the retailer to stock lower quantities of strategic inventories, mean-
ing that the availability of investment in process improvement dramatically alters the interaction
between the two supply chain agents. For larger γ values, we find that this reduction of inventory
occurs only for a sufficiently low holding cost rate or a sufficiently large holding cost rate, whereas
for intermediate values, strategic inventories will marginally increase.
These opposing results regarding the impact of the holding cost rate on strategic inventories
raise an important question: do the insights derived in our core analysis still hold? Omitting the
analysis, especially as expressions are less tractable, we can show that all qualitative results hold
through.
5.3 Strategic Consumers
Thus far we have assumed that consumers behave myopically, in the sense that they only respond
to the price they observe upon their arrival. In practice, however, consumers may develop some
expectations about future prices, and they may delay their purchase if they expect prices to drop
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in the future.13
Let us consider the prices realized in the previous section. Careful inspection of the prices leads
us to the following conclusion:
Corollary 1. When the supplier may invest in process improvement and the retailer may stock
strategic inventories (case PS), p1 > p2.
The possibility of lower market prices in the second period raises an opportunity for consumers
to behave strategically. Strategic consumers are willing to wait for a later period if they expect
the future price to be lower, which is exactly what we see in the PS case. For simplicity of
exposition, we assume that strategic consumer behavior is characterized by full patience such that
these consumers perceive the good purchased in the second period as equally good as that purchased
in the first period (see, e.g., Mersereau and Zhang 2012).14 Hence, if the strategic consumers expect
the second period price to be lower than the first period price, they will wait for the second period.
However, if they expect the price to increase over time, then they will all purchase immediately
and will not wait. In line with Mersereau and Zhang (2012), we further assume that a fraction α
of the consumers are strategic.15
In the presence of strategic consumers, several interesting challenges emerge. Will the decreasing
price path from the PS case be maintained, or will the supplier and retailer circumvent strategic
consumers and will try to encourage them to purchase early? How will the prices change if the
13There is an expansive literature that considers the presence of strategic consumers—those consumers who take
into account future realizations of prices and act upon their price and product availability expectations. Generally, the
literature is in agreement on the detrimental effects induced by the presence of strategic consumers (e.g., for a review of
monopoly models in the presence of strategic consumers, see Kremer et al. 2017). Accordingly, numerous contributions
have explored methods of counteracting the presence of such consumers, for example, via price commitments or
presentation strategies (see the review by Aviv et al. 2009). One such approach that can actually benefit the retailer
is proposed by Aviv and Wei (2014), who suggest firms to offer reward mechanisms that incentivize customers to
purchase early. According to Li et al. (2014), strategic consumers can be beneficial in the context of airline pricing, as
their patience allow the airline to occasionally drop the price thereby segmenting between different consumers types.
14One can further model strategic consumers as having a lower utility due to waiting. For instance, letting v denote
a consumer’s valuation, the immediate utility is given by v− p1 whereas the utility from buying in the second period
is discounted by a factor δ due to waiting, for example, since one needs to invest time following the price or the
reduced time during which the product can be used. Thus, the delayed utility is given by δ(v− p2) and the strategic
consumer compares the two utilities upon deciding in the first period whether to buy or to wait.
15Some argue that consumers can choose whether to behave strategically or myopically, as is the case in the
modeling framework of Aflaki et al. (2016). Further, note that since our setting is deterministic, we abstract away
from rationing and stock out considerations, see, e.g., Liu and Van Ryzin (2008). More generally, our model in this
section is closely related to Shum et al. (2017). We extend their framework in several dimensions. Importantly, we
consider a supply chain consisting of a retailer and a supplier, and account for the presence of strategic inventories. In
addition, we let the supplier invest in process improvement efforts. As such, our paper is the first to (1) consider the
use of process improvement as a tool for the supplier to eliminate strategic inventories, and (2) study the interaction
between strategic consumers and strategic inventories.
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decreasing path is maintained? Namely, knowing that strategic consumers will wait, will the two
prices be farther apart (to increase segmentation) or will they be closer to each other? Further, if
prices decrease over time, will the retailer alter the amount of inventories carried over and will the
supplier change his investment in process improvement?
To address these challenging questions, let Dsw denote the size of the first period cohort that
strategically wait until the second period. Note that Dsw ∈ {0, α}. That is, if consumers expect
p1 ≤ p2, then none of them wait and hence Dsw = 0, whereas if they expect p1 > p2, then Dsw = α
as all strategic consumers wait.16 Thus, the inverse demand function in the second period is given by
p2 = 1− 11+Dsw (q2+I), as the base demand in the second period increases by the additionalDsw units
and the slope of the inverse demand function is adjusted accordingly. The corresponding retailer’s
profit in the second period is (letting the superscript SS refer to Strategic inventories and Strategic
consumers) ΠSSR,2 = (q2 +I)p2−q2w2, which yields q2 = 12(1−w2)(1+Dsw)−I. The supplier’s profit
in the second period is ΠSSS,2 = (w2 + x)q2 =
w2+x
2 ((1− w2)(1 +Dsw)− I) , which is maximized for
w2 =
1−x
2 − I1+Dsw . The retailer’s total profit is given by ΠSSR = q1(p1 − w1) − I(w1 + h) + ΠSSR,2.
Note that due to the strategic waiting of customers, we have q1 = (1−p1)(1−Dsw). The supplier’s
total profit is ΠSSS = w1(q1 + I) + Π
SS
S,2 − 12γx2.
Equilibrium outcomes are given in Online Appendix F. The first insight is important as it
reveals that the declining pricing path is preserved (i.e., pSS1 > p
SS
2 ). That is, the supply chain’s
members do not discourage strategic waiting and all of the strategic consumers wait for the second
period to take advantage of the lower price (see appendix for additional details). The second insight
pertains to the behavior of prices. Interestingly, we find that the behavior of the two prices with
respect to the proportion of strategic consumers is not monotonic. Specifically, we find that if the
holding cost is sufficiently low, then both prices increase in α; within some intermediary range of
h values p1 increases in α whereas p2 decreases in α; and for sufficiently high holding cost p1 is
independent of α while p2 decrease in α. We elaborate more and demonstrate this behavior in the
online appendix.
The presence of waiting consumers has further implications for the decisions and interactions
16Technically speaking, strategic consumers’ decision of whether to buy in the first period or to wait involves their
utility. Specifically, a consumer with valuation v compares his utility from the first period, v − p1, with the utility
gained from waiting δ(v − p2), where δ reflects the discount factor or the consumer patience, which is assumed to
equal to 1 (as we limit our attention to perfectly patient strategic consumers). Thus, if p1 > p2 then v−p1 < δ(v−p2)
and all strategic consumers simply wait, as we state in the text.
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between the supplier and the retailer. Since these consumers wait for the second period, any
investment into process improvement will take effect on a larger volume of consumers, thereby
incentivizing the supplier to increase the investment, which, in turn could induce the retailer to
stock less inventory, or none at all, as the second period wholesale price will ultimately decrease.
Indeed, we find that the parameter space for carrying strategic inventories diminishes as hˆSS—the
threshold below which strategic inventories are carried—decreases in α. However, quite importantly,
inventories are still carried, and their levels may even be increased. Quite naturally, the supplier
increases the investment in process improvement.17
Proposition 7. (i) The parameter range where strategic inventories are carried is decreasing in
α. That is, ∂hˆ
SS
∂α < 0. Further, (ii) inventory may decrease in α, increase in α, or both. Also,
inventory increases in γ. Finally, (iii) x increases in α when strategic inventories are carried
(h < hˆSS) as well as when no strategic inventories are carried (h ≥ hˆSS).
The behavior of inventory is illustrated in Figure 5. We see that the inventory generally de-
creases in α, which is as expected as the importance of postponing the retailer’s purchasing decision
increases as more consumers will buy in the second period. Yet, it is quite puzzling that inventory
may actually increase. This occurs when γ is particularly high, for sufficiently low levels of strategic
consumers. Our intuition is that when the process improvement cost parameter is high, then the
investment is rather limited and hence the reduction in the wholesale price is quite limited. To
ensure reduction in the wholesale price, the retailer ends up increasing the inventory by a small
amount to induce the supplier to invest more and reduce the wholesale price. Once there are suf-
ficiently many strategic consumers, the benefit of investing in process improvement is evident and
consequently inventory levels drop.
17We shall only note that the innovation choice increases in the fraction of strategic consumers, with a small drop
once the transition occurs from carrying strategic inventories to not carrying them.
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Figure 5: Optimal Inventory as a function of the fraction of strategic consumers; h = 0.05
Revisiting Propositions 2 and 3, we now assess the interaction between process improvement
and strategic inventories in the presence of strategic consumers. We have the following statement,
which reveals that, qualitatively, the nature of the interaction between the two factors does not
alter when α > 0.
Proposition 8. (i) process improvement suppresses strategic inventories if α > 0 (i.e., ISS |x=0 >
ISS |x>0). (ii) For hˆSS > h > h¯ ≡ −(α
2+4α(γ+6)−28γ+23)
4(α−7)(α−4γ+1) strategic inventories stimulate process
improvement (i.e., xSS |ISS>0 > xSS |ISS=0), whereas if h < h¯, strategic inventories suppress process
improvement (i.e., xSS |ISS>0 < xSS |ISS=0).
Lastly, we note that the profits of both supply chain partners strictly increase in the presence
of strategic consumers. This is driven by the fact that the patience exhibited by consumers allow
the supplier to commit to a larger investment in process improvement to take advantage of the
larger volume of consumers that will visit the retailer in the second period. By further reducing
the unit cost of the good, larger gains can be realized. The dynamics of the interaction between
the retailer and the supplier persist, but to a lesser degree as, in general, the retailer stocks lower
levels of inventory in expectation of lower future wholesale price.
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5.4 Longer Horizons
One of the modeling assumptions that can be challenged relates to the fact that we encompass
both the inventory stocking decision as well as investment in R&D within a single framework.
More specifically, that we allocate the same “weight” to the inventory holding decision, which
may be perceived as a short-term decision, and R&D investment, which may be perceived as a
long-term decision. While it may be true that these two decisions are generally made on different
time scales, our perspective, as in Anand et al. (2008) relates to the strategic aspect of inventory
stocking decisions. Namely, the amount of inventory that a retailer needs to be carried over from
one planning period to the next when decisions of strategic magnitude are carried out by the
supplier. It is natural that a supplier, as in Anand et al. (2008), does not change his wholesale
price before every order is made by the retailer, and to the same degree, the inventory decision in
our model is not at the operational level, rather, it reflects the amount to be carried over when
major changes occur. This is very much in line with papers such as Arya et al. (2014), who focuses
on the interplay between strategic inventories and the decision of a multi-divisional buying firm to
centralize or decentralize buying activities. Such organization structure decisions are likely to take
place on similar time scales as the one central to our paper.
Yet, to consider the interplay between short and long term decisions, assume each period in
our setting is composed of two (or more) sub-periods. Thus, at the beginning of the first period
investment in R&D takes place followed by the sub-periods in which the original and constant
production cost holds. At the final sub-period of the first period, the retailer takes a strategic
inventory decision—how many units to hold before a new production cost takes effect. Then the
players enter the second period, the unit cost is realized and the operational interaction between
the two agents persists. Regardless of the sub-period to sub-period interplay between the supplier
and the retailer, our paper captures the key trade-off between the two strategic decisions in this
setting: the supplier’s investment in R&D at the beginning of the first period, and the retailer’s
inventory decision before the second period.
What happens between the sub-periods? It depends on the assumption relating to the wholesale
price. If the wholesale price is the same in each sub-period of the same period, then pricing during
this period is essentially according to a commitment contract and hence no inventory is carried
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by the retailer between sub-periods (see Anand et al., 2008). However, if the wholesale price is
re-announced in each of the sub-periods, then we essentially resort to the basic model of Anand
et al. (2008) with the results directly applying to this setting.
To conclude, our framework focuses on the strategic component of inventories while truly apply-
ing to the strategic nature of R&D investment, even above and beyond that captured by traditional
R&D models. For instance, in the seminal paper by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), R&D deci-
sions are made in the first stage immediately followed by capacity decisions, whereas our framework
is more consistent with reality where there is a delay between the R&D decision (or investment)
and the timing during which the effects implied by this investment take place.
6 Discussion
Recognizing the strategic role of firms’ sourcing processes, managers must be aware of how to
affect their supply chain partner’s decisions. In supplier-retailer supply chains, retailers may stock
inventories strategically to induce the supplier to reduce their products’ wholesale price at a later
point in time. Specifically, as the strategic inventories allow the retailer to source either from his
own stock or from the supplier, the supplier competes against his own products, forcing him to
reduce the wholesale price. Although previous research has shown that such strategic inventories
can improve supply chain performance (Anand et al., 2008), the supplier may wonder how to
dampen such unwanted competition and consider other options to maintain high selling prices
over stretched periods of time. In this paper, we focus on the effect of the supplier’s process
improvement investments, which reduce the unit production cost and allow the supplier to profitably
reduce wholesale prices. Accordingly, we explore whether investments in process improvement can
eliminate strategic inventories in the supply chain.
Our analysis reveals several important insights. First and foremost, we find that process im-
provement suppresses and can even completely eliminate strategic inventories. This is a new result
that sheds light on the interaction between the two supply chain partners and reflects the strate-
gic interplay between these two factors. Importantly, strategic inventories may stimulate process
improvement when the holding cost is sufficiently high, and suppress it otherwise. This may relate
to the retailer’s incentive to stock strategic inventories. Are these strategic inventories profitable
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in the context of process improvement? We find that they may hurt both the retailer (which is
a natural result in light of Anand et al., 2008) as well as the supplier. The latter result is more
surprising and can be attributed to the reversal of the contract-space-expansion effect due to the
reduced stocking of strategic inventories.
In addition, we have explored several extensions to the model. Explicitly, we have studied the
supplier’s incentive to delay his investment announcement, revealing that he may be worse off (in
particular when the improvement cost parameter, γ, is sufficiently high, implying a high cost for
process improvement); and we have considered the impact induced by the presence of (perfectly)
strategic consumers, suggesting that both the retailer and the manufacturer are better off as they
can gravitate demand to a later period while taking advantage of the reduced cost. We have also
discussed the robustness of the model. In particular, we find that, qualitatively, all results still hold
if the holding cost is endogenous (i.e., wholesale price-dependent) rather than exogenous, and we
have outlined the implications of longer horizons.
Managerially, our work stresses the importance of cost-reducing process improvement, especially
in the presence of strategic inventories carried by the retailer. Both partners need to account for the
interplay between the factors influencing their decision making and properly foresee the strategic
response of their counterpart. Our work highlights a novel and intricate strategic interaction while
abstracting away from several aspects that may prevail in practice. For instance, the interaction
between supplier and retailer may be governed by a Stackelberg (leader-follower) type of setting,
or the two partners may bargain over the magnitude of the process improvement investment and
prices. Further, the supplier may be limited in his manufacturing capacity whereas the retailer may
have a limited storage capacity. Finally, the supplier may have private information about his cost
structure (including his planned process improvement efforts or the result of process improvement
projects) and could consider whether or not to share this information truthfully with the retailer
while, at the same time, the retailer may possess private information about sales and inventory
levels (as is the case in Roy et al., 2018). Such decisions, which depend on many factors (e.g., the
value of the holding cost as in Roy et al., 2018, whether the supplier offers a menu of contracts,
and the prevailing contract mechanism), are left for future exploration.
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Managing Strategic Inventories under Investment in Process
Improvement—Supplementary Materials (Online Appendix)
A Model with market size a and constant cost of production c
In case P, the sufficient second-order conditions in the first stage of the first period yield γ > 14 . In
equilibrium we have q∗1 =
a−c
4 and q
∗
2 =
(a−c)γ
4γ−1 . Clearly we need the condition a > c for quantities to
be strictly positive, which is an assumption frequently encountered in the literature. Furthermore
we have x∗ = a−c4γ−1 , which is strictly positive given the assumptions described. An additional
restriction is that unit cost cannot be negative. That is, c− x∗ ≥ 0. Writing out gives 4γc− a ≥ 0.
In other words, γ and c should be large enough, while a should be small enough. Moreover, given
that γ > 14 there always exist parameter values for a and c that ensure the condition 4γc − a ≥ 0
holds. This condition also ensures w∗2 =
2γ(a+c)−a
4γ−1 is strictly positive, while w
∗
1 =
a+c
2 is strictly
positive always.
In case S, which is the case derived from Anand et al. (2008), we can easily obtain expressions
as functions of a and c. Following a previous line of reasoning again yields the condition a > c. The
limit on the holding cost parameter for strictly positive inventory levels changes to h < a−c4 , showing
how the parameter range for carrying inventories changes with a and c. It is not hard to see that all
equilibrium outcomes are strictly positive, i.e., q∗1 =
1
17(4a−4c+h) > 0, q∗2 = 117(3a−3c+ 5h) > 0,
w∗1 =
1
17(9a+ 8c− 2h) > 0, w∗2 = 117(6a+ 11c+ 10h) > 0.
In case PS, we again have a > c and can show with some manipulations that all equilibrium
outcomes are positive, regardless of the values of a, c, i.e., q∗1 =
8γ(4a−4c+h)−17a+17c−8h
136γ−66 > 0,
q∗2 =
4γ(3a−3c+5h)−2a+2c+h
68γ−33 > 0, x
∗ = 2(5a−5c+14h)68γ−33 > 0, w
∗
1 =
4a(9γ−4)+c(32γ−17)−8(γ−1)h
68γ−33 > 0,
w∗2 =
−24aγ+14a−44cγ+19c−40γh+26h
33−68γ > 0. From the condition c − x∗ > 0 we have γ > 10a+23c+28h68c ,
which is stricter than the well-known condition in this case, given by γ > 3368 . Strategic inventories
are positive if γ > 15(a−c)−24h20(a−c)−80h , which is stricter than the condition γ >
10a+23c+28h
68c for some
parameter values. We can rewrite γ > 15(a−c)−24h20(a−c)−80h to h <
5(a−c)(4γ−3)
80γ−24 , showing that a and c affect
the upper limit on the holding cost in a straightforward manner.
1
B Relevant conditions
In the case with strategic inventories (case S), we have
∂2ΠR,2
∂q22
< 0,
∂2ΠS,2
∂w22
< 0, ∂
2ΠR
∂I2
< 0, ∂
2ΠR
∂q21
< 0
and ∂
2ΠS
∂w21
< 0. In the second stage (where the retailer determines q1 and I), the determinant of the
Hessian matrix is strictly positive to guarantee negative definite solutions. In terms of positivity
of the equilibrium solutions, it is straightforward to verify that all solutions are strictly positive if
I > 0, which is the case if h > 14 .
In the case with process improvement (case P), we have
∂2ΠR,2
∂q22
< 0,
∂2ΠS,2
∂w22
< 0, ∂
2ΠR
∂q21
< 0,
∂2ΠS
∂x2
= 14 − γ and ∂
2ΠS
∂w21
< 0. In the first stage (where the supplier determines x and w1), the
determinant of the Hessian matrix is strictly positive if γ > 14 , which ensures
∂2ΠS
∂x22
< 0 as well.
Inspecting positivity of the outcomes we have w2 > 0 if γ >
1
2 . This condition ensures that all
other solutions are strictly positive.
In the case with process improvement and strategic inventories (case PS), we have
∂2ΠR,2
∂q22
< 0,
∂2ΠS,2
∂w22
< 0, ∂
2ΠR
∂I2
< 0, ∂
2ΠR
∂q21
< 0, ∂
2ΠS
∂x2
= 49−γ and ∂
2ΠS
∂w21
< 0. In the second stage (where the retailer
determines q1 and I), the determinant of the Hessian matrix is always strictly positive. In the first
stage (where the supplier determines x and w1), the determinant of the Hessian matrix is strictly
positive if γ > 3368 , which also ensures
∂2ΠS
∂x2
< 0. Strategic inventories are positive if γ > 3(5−8h)20(1−4h) .
This condition ensures that γ > 3368 for 0 < h <
1
4 , and ensures that all other equilibrium solutions
are strictly positive.
We continue with the case with process improvement, strategic inventories and strategic con-
sumers (case SS). We have
∂2ΠR,2
∂q22
< 0,
∂2ΠS,2
∂w22
< 0, ∂
2ΠR
∂I2
< 0, ∂
2ΠR
∂q21
< 0, ∂
2ΠS
∂x2
= 4(1+α)9 − γ and
∂2ΠS
∂w21
< 0. In the second stage (where the retailer determines q1 and I), the determinant of the
Hessian matrix is always strictly positive. In the first stage (where the supplier determines x and
w1), the determinant of the Hessian matrix is strictly positive if γ > γ¯ ≡ α2+34α+334(17−α) , which also
ensures ∂
2ΠS
∂x2
< 0. Note that γ¯ = 3368 if α = 0 and that γ¯ is increasing in α. Strategic inventories
are positive if h < hˆSS ≡ 14 − 3(α+1)(α+3)8((10−2α)γ+(α−3)(α+1)) . Rewriting this to γ > γˆ ≡ (1+α)(15−8h(3−α)+α)4(1−4h)(5−α) ,
we observe that always γˆ > γ¯ and that all other equilibrium solutions are strictly positive if γ > γˆ.
When strategic inventories are zero, all relevant sufficient second-order conditions are satisfied
if γ > 1+α4 and all equilibrium solutions are positive if γ >
1+α
2 .
2
C Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We solve the model using backwards induction. The retailer’s second period
profit is given by ΠR,2 = (q2 + I)(1 − q2 − I) − q2w2, and the profit maximizing order quantity is
q∗2 =
1
2(1 − w2) − I. The supplier’s second period profit is given by ΠS,2 = q2(w2 + x) which is
maximized at w∗2 =
1
2(1− x)− I. Proceeding with the first period, we maximize the retailer’s total
profit, ΠR = −34I2 + (−h − 14x − w1 + 34)I − q21 − w1q1 + q1 + (x+1)
2
16 , subject to q > 0 and I ≥ 0.
Thus, we have the following Lagrangian: LR(q, I) = ΠR +λR1q+λR2I, which yields two solutions.
When the inventory constraint is not binding, we have I = 12 − x6 − 2(w1+h)3 and q1 = 1−w12 ,
which is positive as long as w1 < 1. It worth noting that dI/dx < 0, that is, the incentive to stock
inventories decreases in the investment in process improvement. Given these retailer’s decisions,
we maximize the supplier’s profit, ΠS = −1718w21 + (4h+5x+18)w118 + (−9γ+4)x
2
18 − 4xh9 + 2h
2
9 subject to
w1 > 0 and x ≥ 0. Similarly, we solve the supplier’s Lagrangian: LS(q, I) = ΠS + λS1x + λS2w1,
which yields two solutions. When x is not binding, we have x = 2(5+14h)68γ−33 and w1 =
4(−2γh+9γ+2h−4)
68γ−33 .
We observe that x is never binding, as γ > 12 and 0 < h <
1
4 implying x > 0.
When the inventory constraint is binding, which occurs when h > 5(4γ−3)8(10γ−3) , we have I = 0 and
q = 1−w12 . Solving the supplier’s problem, we have w1 =
1
2 and x =
1
4γ−1 when the x constraint is
not binding. Again, we observe that x is never binding, as γ > 12 implying x > 0.
Plugging these optimal values in I, w2, p1, p2, and profit functions, gives rise to the expressions
in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2. Equating strategic inventory levels in the case with and without process
improvement and solving yields only solutions in the space with negative h. We will suppress any
additional details.
Proof of Proposition 3. Equating process improvement levels in the case with and without strategic
inventories yields the solution h = 28γ−2328(4γ−1) . Comparing the solution with the upper boundary for
positive strategic inventories h = 5(4γ−3)8(10γ−3) , we have
28γ−23
28(4γ−1) <
5(4γ−3)
8(10γ−3) for any γ >
1
2 . Some
numerical checks in the areas where h < 28γ−2328(4γ−1) and
28γ−23
28(4γ−1) < h <
5(4γ−3)
8(10γ−3) suffice to complete
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Equating supplier/retailer profits in the case with process improvement
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(with non-zero strategic inventories)—as given in (7) and (8)— and without process improvement
(with non-zero strategic inventories)—as given in (1) and (2)—and solving yields only solutions in
the space with negative h. We will suppress any additional details.
Note that in the area 5(4γ−3)8(10γ−3) < h <
1
4 inventories are carried in case S but not in case PS.
This implies that firm profits in case PS are equal to the profits in case P. Equating firm profits in
case S with the profits in case P we see that the main finding, which is that process improvement
benefits the supply chain agents, still holds if inventories are not carried in case PS.
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider the supplier’s profit. Comparing the profit when h < 5(4γ−3)8(10 γ−3)
with the profit when no strategic inventories are carried gives rise to the threshold h1,2 =
32 γ2−40 γ+8±
√
272 γ2−200 γ+33
4(32 γ2−12 γ+1) . We can show that h1 always exceeds the threshold h =
5(4γ−3)
8(10 γ−3)
in the area with non-negative h. Thus, we have that when 5(4γ−3)8(10 γ−3) > h > h2 the supplier is worse
off when the retailer carries strategic inventories. If h < h2, the supplier is better off with strategic
inventories. Note that this condition is only relevant if γ > 17+
√
41
16 ≈ 1.46.
Consider the retailer’s profit. Comparing the profit when h < 5(4γ−3)8(10 γ−3) with the profit when no
strategic inventories are carried gives rise to the threshold h1,2 =
3776γ3−6320γ2+2524γ−295±√X
4(1216γ2−752γ+173)(4γ−1) , with
X = 1183744γ6 + 17790976γ5 − 34972416γ4 + 27232384γ3 − 10748192γ2 + 2054712γ − 132858. As
before, we have h1 >
5(4γ−3)
8(10 γ−3) > h2.
Proof of Proposition 6. In this case, all sufficient second-order conditions and positivity conditions
are satisfied if γ > 0.631.
Recall that in the PS case we need h < 5(4γ−3)8(10γ−3) for strictly positive strategic inventories. Define
hˆD = 2(80γ
4−144γ3+76γ2−15γ+1)
(4γ−1)2(40γ2−24γ+3) . For h < hˆ
D we have strictly positive strategic inventories in the
delayed investment case. Clearly hˆD < 5(4γ−3)8(10γ−3) for every γ >
1
2 .
Solving IPS = ID yields h = −2(992γ
4−1040γ3+388γ2−58γ+3)
2944γ4−2272γ3+520γ2−20γ−3 . The right-hand side of this function
is negative for any γ > 12 , showing that the solution to I
PS = ID does not switch sign in the area
where 0 < h < hˆD. A numerical check suffices to show that in that area, IPS > ID.
For parameter values hˆD < h < 5(4γ−3)8(10γ−3) no strategic inventories are carried in the delayed
investment case, while in the PS case strictly positive inventories are carried. Solving xPS = xD in
this area yields h = 28γ−2328(4γ−1) , which is strictly in between hˆ
D and 5(4γ−3)8(10γ−3) . For hˆ
D < h < 28γ−2328(4γ−1)
we have xD > xPS , while for 28γ−2328(4γ−1) < h <
5(4γ−3)
8(10γ−3) , x
PS > xD.
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Solving xPS = xD yields h =
2(544γ4−896γ3+588γ2−154γ+13)
4352γ4−6080γ3+2472γ2−344γ+13 . The right-hand side of this function
is larger than hˆD for any γ > 0.631, showing that the solution to xPS = xD does not switch sign
in the area where 0 < h < hˆD. A numerical check suffices to show that in that area, xD > xPS .
Solving pPS1 = p
D
1 and w
PS
1 = w
D
1 yields h =
2(208γ4−384γ3+188γ2−28γ+1)
576γ4−272γ3+12γ2−2γ+1 . The right-hand side
of this function is below hˆD for 1.06035 < γ < 1.30902. In this area pD1 > p
PS
1 and w
D
1 > w
PS
1 .
Otherwise, pPS1 > p
D
1 and w
PS
1 > w
D
1 .
Solving pPS2 = p
D
2 and w
PS
2 = w
D
2 yields h = −
2(224γ4−72γ3−100γ2+48γ−5)
3648γ4−4176γ3+1496γ2−182γ+5 . The right-hand side
of this function does not cross the area where 0 < h < hˆD. A numerical check suffices to show that
in that area, pD2 > p
PS
2 and w
D
2 > w
PS
2 .
Proof of Corollary 1. When h ≥ 5(4γ−3)8(10 γ−3) , the first period price exceeds that of the second period
since always 3γ−14γ−1 <
3
4 . When h <
5(4γ−3)
8(10 γ−3) , the first period price exceeds that of the second period
when h < 6γ−124γ−17 . Notice that the condition h <
5(4γ−3)
8(10 γ−3) is relevant only when γ >
3
4 , and that
6γ−1
24γ−17 >
1
4 for any γ >
3
4 . This implies that whenever strategic inventories are carried, p1 > p2.
Proof of Proposition 7. (i) Differentiating the threshold, α
2+4αγ+16α−20γ+15
8(3−α2+2αγ+2α−10γ) , with respect to α
gives 3(α
2γ+3α2−10αγ+6α−23γ+3)
4(α2−2αγ−2α+10γ−3)2 , which is negative when
5γ−3−2
√
12γ2+9γ
γ+3 < α <
5γ−3+2
√
12γ2+9γ
γ+3 .
Note that
5γ−3−2
√
12γ2+9γ
γ+3 is negative for every γ > 0 and that
5γ−3+2
√
12γ2+9γ
γ+3 > 1 for every
γ > 3368 . Hence, the threshold is decreasing in α.
(ii) We only need to consider the case of h < hˆSS . Solving ∂I∂α = 0 yields two solutions for γ,
expressed in terms of α and h. Expressions are large and therefore omitted. It is straightforward
to show that the first solution has no relevant intersection with the lower boundary of the feasible
parameter region (given by γ as functions of α and hˆSS), so that a numerical check suffices that
show that this solution is not within the feasible parameter region. The second solution also has
no relevant intersection with the lower boundary of the feasible parameter region, but lies strictly
above it. This suggests that, given a γ value, ∂I∂α has either no or one sign change. Some numerical
samples show that for low γ values (e.g., γ = 1) we have ∂I∂α < 0, whereas for larger γ values (e.g.,
γ = 3) ∂I∂α shifts from increasing to decreasing in the α direction. For even larger γ values and low
h values (e.g., γ = 7, h = 0.05), we observe that ∂I∂α > 0.
Solving ∂I∂γ = 0 we only need to consider the case of h < hˆ
SS . It is straightforward to show that
inventory increases in γ since ∂I∂γ =
12(α+1)2(α+3)(2(7−α)h+5)
(α2+4αγ+34α−68γ+33)2 > 0.
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(iii) When no inventories are carried, ∂x∂α =
4γ
(α−4γ+1)2 > 0. When inventories are carried,
∂x
∂α =
2(8α2γh+80α2h−272αγh+5α2+160αh+872γh+10α+360γ+80h+5)
(α2+4αγ+34α−68γ+33)2 . This expression is positive when h =
0, since ∂x∂α |h=0 = 2(5α
2+10α+360γ+5)
(α2+4αγ+34α−68γ+33)2 > 0. We will show that
∂x
∂α is increasing in h.
∂x2
∂αh =
16(α2γ+10α2−34αγ+20α+109γ+10)
(α2+4αγ+34α−68γ+33)2 > 0 since the denominator is linearly increasing in γ and strictly
positive when γ = 3368 .
Proof of Proposition 8. process improvement suppresses strategic inventories if α > 0. Does strate-
gic inventories suppress process improvement? Equating the two process improvement levels and
solving yields the solution h¯ = −(α
2+4α(γ+6)−28γ+23)
4(α−7)(α−4γ+1) , which is strictly below hˆ
SS . For hˆSS > h > h¯
strategic inventories stimulate process improvement. For h < h¯, strategic inventories suppress pro-
cess improvement. Thus the results given in Propositions 3 and 2 do not qualitatively change if
α > 0.
D Illustrating the range of Omega
Figure 6 demonstrates the region Ω, i.e., the range of h and γ values under which a transition from
case N to case PS is harmful to the retailer. This region is defined as the range of h values such
that h < h < h, where h and h are functions of γ, with h (resp., h) monotonically decreasing (resp.,
increasing) in γ and converging to 0.138 (resp., 0.25)—the corresponding values from Anand et al.
(2008). We shall note that h and h are feasible only when γ > 21.351.
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Figure 6: Range of Ω
E Delayed Investment Announcement
When the supplier delays the process improvement investment announcement to period 2, then in
equilibrium
ID =

2−640γ4h+160γ4+704γ3h−288γ3−280γ2h+152γ2+48γh−30γ−3h
4(272γ4−368γ3+168γ2−31γ+2) h < hˆ
D,
0 otherwise,
(9)
xD =

(4γ−1)(40γ2h+24γ2−24γh−16γ+3h+2)
2(272γ4−368γ3+168γ2−31γ+2) h < hˆ
D,
1
4γ−1 otherwise,
(10)
[wD1 , w
D
2 ] =

[
2−32γ4(2h−9)+128γ3(h−3)−4γ2(17h−44)+2γ(7h−16)+h
2(272γ4−368γ3+168γ2−31γ+2) ,
(4γ−1)(2γ−1)(8γ2(5h+3)−8γ(3h+2)+3h+2)
2(272γ4−368γ3+168γ2−31γ+2)
]
h < hˆD,[
1
2 ,
2γ−1
4γ−1
]
otherwise,
(11)
7
[pD1 , p
D
2 ] =

[
6−64γ4(h−13)+32γ3(4h−35)−4γ2(17h−128)+14γh−94γ−h
4(272γ4−368γ3+168γ2−31γ+2) ,
γ4(320h+736)+γ3(1008−432h)+γ2(208h+472)−γ(42h+90)+3(h+2)
4(272γ4−368γ3+168γ2−31γ+2)
]
h < hˆD,[
3
4 ,
3γ−1
4γ−1
]
otherwise,
(12)
where hˆD ≡ 2(80γ4−144γ3+76γ2−15γ+1)
(40γ2−24γ+3)(4γ−1)2 . The resulting profits of the retailer and the supplier are,
respectively,
ΠDS =

(8γ−1)(4γ−1)3h2−4h(4γ−1)2(4γ2−6γ+1)+4(12γ2−8γ+1)2
8(272γ4−368γ3+168γ2−31γ+2)2 h < hˆ
D,
8 γ−1
8(4 γ−1) otherwise,
(13)
and
ΠDR =

∆1h2−∆2h+∆3
8(272γ4−368γ3+168γ2−31γ+2)2 h < hˆ
D,
32 γ2−8 γ+1
16(4 γ−1)2 otherwise,
(14)
where
∆1 = (9728γ
6 − 18368γ5 + 13928γ4 − 5384γ3 + 1116γ2 − 118γ + 5)(1− 4γ)2,
∆2 = 4(15104γ
8 − 45056γ7 + 54560γ6 − 35440γ5 + 13552γ4 − 3132γ3 + 429γ2 − 32γ + 1), and
∆3 = 4(19840γ
8 − 51968γ7 + 56928γ6 − 34176γ5 + 12392γ4 − 2800γ3 + 387γ2 − 30γ + 1).
F Strategic Consumers
We first derive the equilibrium outcomes. Relying on Corollary 1, we assume that in the presence
of strategic consumers, we also have p1 > p2. Below we show that this assumption is satisfied and
hence constitutes an equilibrium.
Solving this model backwards, yields the threshold hˆ = α
2+4αγ+16α−20γ+15
8(3−α2+2αγ+2α−10γ) below which strate-
gic inventories are carried, and none otherwise. Accordingly, we have process improvement and
prices as prescribed by (16) and (18), respectively. The expressions of the order quantities are
omitted due to their length.
We next verify that the assumption that p1 > p2 is satisfied. When h ≥ α2+4αγ+16α−20γ+158(3−α2+2αγ+2α−10γ)
we have that [p1, p2] =
[
3
4 ,
α−3γ+1
α−4γ+1
]
. Since p2 is decreasing in α (because
∂p2
∂α =
γ
(α−4γ+1)2 ), we
estimate p2 when it obtains the highest values, that is, when α = 0. Since p2|α=0 = 3γ−14γ−1 < 34 for
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every γ < ∞, we conclude that p1 < p2. When h < α2+4αγ+16α−20γ+158(3−α2+2αγ+2α−10γ) we have that p1 − p2 =
(−α2−18α+24γ−17)h+α−6γ+1
α2+4αγ+34α−68γ+33 , which is decreasing in γ since
∂(p1−p2)
∂γ =
2(α+13)(1+α)(2αh−14h−5)
(α2+4αγ+34α−68γ+33)2 < 0.
Hence, we evaluate p1 − p2 at γ → ∞. We have (p1 − p2)|γ→∞ = 3(4h−1)2(α−17) , since this expression is
decreasing in h we further estimate it at the largest value h obtained in this range, that is, when
h = hˆ, giving lim
γ→∞(p1 − p2)|h=hˆ = 0. Hence, the assumption that p1 > p2 is satisfied.
In the presence of strategic consumers the equilibrium outcomes are given by:
ISS =

(1+α)(8α2h−16αγh+α2+4αγ−16αh+80γh+16α−20γ−24h+15)
2(α2+4αγ+34α−68γ+33) h < hˆ
SS ,
0 otherwise,
(15)
xSS =

2(1+α)(2αh−14h−5)
α2+4αγ+34α−68γ+33 h < hˆ
SS ,
1+α
4γ−α−1 otherwise,
(16)
[wSS1 , w
SS
2 ] =

[−4(2α2h−2αγh+4αh−2γh−4α+9γ+2h−4)
α2+4αγ+34α−68γ+33 ,
−2(3α2h−4αγh−10αh+20γh−7α+12γ−13h−7)
α2+4αγ+34α−68γ+33
]
h < hˆSS ,[
1
2 ,
α−2γ+1
α−4γ+1
]
otherwise,
(17)
[pSS1 , p
SS
2 ] =

[
(1−8h)α2+(8γh+4γ−16h+50)α+8γh−104γ−8h+49
2(α2+(4γ+34)α−68γ+33) ,
(1−6h)α2+(8γh+4γ+20h+48)α−40γh−92γ+26h+47
2(α2+(4γ+34)α−68γ+33)
]
h < hˆSS ,[
3
4 ,
α−3γ+1
α−4γ+1
]
otherwise,
(18)
where h < hˆSS ≡ 14 − 3(α+1)(α+3)8((10−2α)γ+(α−3)(α+1)) defines the area where inventory is strictly positive.
The profit expressions are omitted due to their length.
We have the following insight:
Corollary 2. Similar to the base model, in the presence of strategic consumers, p1 > p2.
Proof of Corollary 2. Follows from (18).
The second insight pertains to the behavior of prices. Interestingly, we find that the behavior
of the two prices with respect to the proportion of strategic consumers is not monotonic.
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Corollary 3.
∂[pSS1 , p
SS
2 ]
∂α
=

[> 0, > 0] h < min{hˆSS , hp2},
[> 0, < 0] hp2 < h < hˆSS ,
[= 0, < 0] otherwise,
(19)
where hp2 ≡ −7α2+24αγ+48γ2−14α−96γ−7
16(α2γ+7α2−28αγ+12γ2+14α−5γ+7) . Further,
∂[pSS1 −pSS2 ]
∂α > 0 in each of the regions defined
in (19).
Proof of Corollary 3. Solving ∂p1∂α = 0 we have h
p1 ≡ (6γ−α−1)(2α+3γ+2)
(5α−139)(α+1)γ+32(α+1)2+72γ2 . We verify
whether hp1 is in the feasible range given by 0 ≤ h ≤ hˆSS for any α ∈ (0, 1) and γ > 3368 .
Solving hp1 = hˆSS yields γ1 =
16(1+α)
61−5α and γ2 =
α2+34α+33
4(17−α) . Clearly γ1, γ2 > 0 for α ∈ (0, 1).
Considering the first solution, we have that hp1 |γ=γ1 = − 5(α+7)(α−17)8(5α2−44α+23) , which yields an asymptote
at α = 15
(
22− 3√41) ≈ 0.558125. It is easy to verify that hp1 |γ=γ1 > 0.25 for α ∈ {0, 0.558125..},
while hp1 |γ=γ1 < 0 for α ∈ (0.558125.., 1). Considering the second solution, we have that hp1 |γ=γ2 =
5
2(α−7) < 0. Thus, we can conclude that the plane given by h
p1 does not cross the feasible range
given by 0 ≤ h ≤ hˆSS , α ∈ (0, 1), γ > 3368 . In that range, the derivative ∂p1∂α does not switch sign,
and it is now straightforward to check that ∂p1∂α > 0.
We now proceed with the FOC of p2. Solving the FOC,
∂p2
∂α =
(−16γh−112h−7)α2+((448h+24)γ−224h−14)α+(−192h+48)γ2+(80h−96)γ−112h−7
(α2+(4γ+34)α−68γ+33)2 = 0, for h, we have that this
derivative is positive when h < hp2 ≡ −7α2+24αγ+48γ2−14α−96γ−7
16(α2γ+7α2−28αγ+12γ2+14α−5γ+7) , noting that the denominator
is always positive (this can be observed by equating the denominator to 0 and solving for α and
the resulting two roots are both greater than 1 for γ > 0).
Consider the case of h ≥ hˆSS . It is evident that p2 is independent of α, hence ∂p1∂α = 0.
∂p2
∂α = − γ(α−4γ+1)2 < 0.
Lastly, showing that
∂[pSS1 −pSS2 ]
∂α > 0 follows the same arguments.
Generally, the first period price increases in the proportion of strategic consumers whenever
inventories are carried. This indicates that the diversion of the strategic consumers to the later
period allows the retailer to improve the segmentation by targeting consumers with higher valu-
ations in the first period. Further, while the second period price might increase or decrease in
the proportion of strategic consumers (depending on the value of h), the separation between the
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first and second period prices always increases in α in each of the regions. This occurs due to the
aforementioned segmentation coupled with the reduction in unit cost (due to greater investment in
process improvement as discussed below) that is mostly passed on to the consumers.
The different behaviors of prices are illustrated in the two panels of Figure 7. Consider first
Figure 7a. The dashed vertical line indicates the value of α such that h = hˆSS . To the left of
this dashed vertical line, the value of h is such that hp2 < h < hˆSS . Accordingly, we observe how
p1 increases in the proportion of strategic consumers whereas p2 decreases in this proportion. To
the right of the dashed line, no inventories are carried, and then the first period price is fixed in
α whereas the second period price decreases in α. Consider Figure 7b. To the right of the dashed
line, the value of h is such that h < hˆSS < hp2 . Accordingly, two prices increase in α. As before,
to the right of hˆSS , p1 is fixed in α whereas the second period price decreases in α.
(a) γ = 1.5, h = 0.05, with hˆSS = 0.05 at α ≈
0.493
(b) γ = 4, h = 0.15, with hˆSS = 0.15 at α ≈
0.934
Figure 7: Prices as a function of the fraction of strategic consumers
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